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FOOTNOTES
1 I.R.C. § 2503.  See generally 6 Harl, Agricultural Law § 46.04[1]
(1993); Harl, Agricultural Law Manual § 6.01 (1993).
2 Treas. Reg. §§ 25.6019-1, 25.6075-1.
3 I.R.C. § 2503(b).
4 Id.
5 See n. 2 supra.
6 See I.R.C. §§ 2503, 2505.
7 Rev. Rul. 71-443, 1971-2 C.B. 337.  See Ltr. Rul. 7935115, May 31,
1979 (transfer of corporate stock to issuing corporation); Ltr. Rul.
8422015, Feb. 15, 1984 (same).
8 See Stark v. U.S., 345 F. Supp. 1263 (W.D. Mo. 1972), aff'd, 477 F.2d
131 (8th Cir. 1973).
9 Wooley v. U.S., 90-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 60,013 (S.D. Ind. 1990).
10 McClure v. U.S., 79-2 U.S.T.C. ¶ 13,319 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
11 Maryland Nat'l Bank v. U.S., 609 F.2d 1078 (4th Cir. 1979).
12 McManus v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1980-296, aff'd, 82-1 U.S.T.C. ¶
13,456 (6th Cir. 1982).
13 See Rev. Rul. 75-415, 1975-2 C.B. 374.
14 Crummey v. Comm’r, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968).
15 Id.
16 Ltr. Rul. 8006048, Nov. 16, 1979.
17 Ltr. Rul. 8022048, March 4, 1980 (trust contribution two days before
the end of calendar year; annual exclusion allowed because donor was
natural guardian of minor and local law permitted natural guardians to
exercise withdrawal rights); Ltr. Rul. 8308033, Nov. 23, 1982 (each
beneficiary had unrestricted right for 30 days to withdraw; annual
exclusion available if notice given and no impediment to appointment
of guardian under local law).  See Rev. Rul. 73-405, 1973-2 C.B. 321
(gift tax annual exclusion allowed even though no fiduciary appointed;
no impediment in trust or local law to appointment).
18 Est. of Cristofani v. Comm’r, 97 T.C. 74 (1991), acq. in result only,
1992-1 C.B. 1 (right to withdraw limited to 15 days after property
contributed to trusts).  See AOD 1992-09 (IRS will deny exclusions
for powers held by individuals who either have no property interests in
trusts except for Crummey powers or hold only contingent remainder
interests).  Compare Ltr. Rul. 9141008, June 24, 1991 (annual
exclusion not allowed for grandchildren as remote contingent
beneficiaries with limited demand rights).
19 Naumoff v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1983-435; Ltr. Rul. 8485004, June
27, 1984 (same).  See also Ltr. Rul. 8433024, May 10, 1984 (present
interest in trust transferred where beneficiary had power to demand
interest and contributions to trust from past year on annual basis).
20 Est. of Kolker v. Comm’r, 80 T.C. 1082 (1983) (each beneficiary
living on donor's birthday to receive distribution from trust).
21 Karpf v. Karpf, 240 Neb. 302, 481 N.W.2d 891 (1992) (no damages,
however).
22 See Ross v. Comm’r, 652 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1981) (provision that
interest passed to "heirs at law" rather than to donee's estate made
annual exclusion unavailable).
23 Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-4(b)(1).  See Illinois Nat'l Bank of Springfield
v. U.S., 91-1 U.S.T.C. ¶ 60,063 (C.D. Ill. 1991) (substantial restriction
existed because trust limited use of funds to education and disability;
annual exclusion not allowed).
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES. A creditor who had
sold cattle feed to the debtor during the bankruptcy case,
sought payment as an administrative expense under Section
506(c) for the feed from the proceeds of the sale of the
cattle. A creditor with a security interest in the cattle
objected, arguing that only a trustee had the authority to
seek administrative expense status for expenses used to
preserve collateral. The court held that creditors also have
standing to seek administrative expense status for property
used to preserve collateral.  However, the court also held
that because the creditor had not filed an adversary
proceeding under Bankr. Rule 7001 and no evidence had
been presented as to whether the feed was a reasonable and
necessary expense which benefitted the secured creditor, the
proceeds would be paid to the trustee pending the filing of
an adversary proceeding. In re Blaisure, 150 B.R. 343
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1992).
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS. In December 1988, the
debtor executed an agreement to purchase a one-half
interest in a horse owned by a creditor. The purchase
agreement granted the seller a security interest in the
debtor’s interest in the horse to secure the purchase price
which was to be paid over six years. The financing
statement was not filed until May 1991, less than 90 days
before the debtor filed for bankruptcy.  The court held that
the perfection of the security interest was an avoidable
transfer. In re Calumet Farm, Inc., 150 B.R. 403 (Bankr.
E.D. Ky. 1992).
DISCHARGE-ALM § 13.06.* The creditor sold
produce to a corporation in which the debtor was the
president, principal shareholder and bookkeeper. The
creditor filed a notice of the claim with the USDA to
preserve its rights in the PACA trust and obtained a default
judgment against the corporation. The creditor sought to
have the claim declared nondischargeable for defalcation
while acting in a fiduciary duty. The court held that the
debtor was a fiduciary as to the PACA trust as a responsible
person in the corporation and the failure to preserve the
trust for creditors was defalcation making the debt
nondischargeable.  In re Harper, 150 B.R. 416 (Bankr.
E.D. Tenn. 1993).
EXEMPTIONS-ALM § 13.03[4].
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtor claimed a homestead
exemption and sought to avoid judicial liens against the
homestead as impairing the exemption. The Ohio
exemption provided an exemption for a homestead only
upon a judicial sale of the homestead. The debtor argued
that Owen v. Owen, 111 S.Ct. 1833 (1991) required that the
judicial liens be avoided. The court held that Owen did not
apply because the debtor had no exemption right until a
judicial sale occurred, whereas in Owen, the debtor had a
right to the exemption as of the bankruptcy filing but the
state exemption law attempted to remove the exemption as
to judicial liens. In re Braverman, 150 B.R. 681 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1993).
CONVERSION. Within one month prior to filing for
bankruptcy, the debtors sold several non-exempt, non-
attached properties and purchased exempt property. A
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creditor had just obtained a judgment against the debtors but
was unable to attach any of the property before the
bankruptcy case was filed. The court held that under these
circumstances, the transfer of non-exempt assets into
exempt assets was fraudulent and denied the exemption as
to the converted property. In re Scwarb, 150 B.R. 470
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
HOMESTEAD. Prior to filing for bankruptcy, the debtor
had filed for divorce. The marital property included a
residence to which only the debtor’s spouse had title. The
debtor and spouse both filed for bankruptcy and the cases
were jointly administered but not consolidated. After the
case was filed, the divorce was granted and the debtor
received a one-half interest in the residence. The debtor
claimed a homestead exemption in this portion of the
residence. The court held that the debtor interest in the
residence was only as an unsecured creditor and that the
debtor’s exemption was limited to the amount recoverable
from the spouse’s bankruptcy estate. In re McCulley, 150
B.R. 358 (Bankr. M.D. 1993).
HOUSEHOLD GOODS. The debtor filed a list of 1,553
items of property as exempt under La. Rev. Stat. § 13:3881.
The court held that the exemptions would not be allowed
because the list was filed in bad faith since most of the
items were not entitled to an exemption, but the court
allowed the debtor to amend the schedule, with the warning
that failure to remove items not reasonably entitled to an
exemption could result in denial of all claimed exemptions.
Ward v. Turner, 150 B.R. 378 (E.D. La. 1993).
OBJECTIONS. The debtor claimed an exemption for
pension and profit sharing plans and an interest in an IRA.
No creditor filed a timely objection to the exemptions but
one creditor filed a late objection to the exemption of the
plans and IRA.  The court held that under Taylor v.
Freeland & Kronz, 112 S.Ct. 1644 (1992), the failure to
timely object to a claimed exemption was an absolute bar to
consideration of the merit of the exemption.  In re Kazi,
985 F.2d 318 (7th Cir. 1993), aff’g unrep. D. Ct. dec.
aff’g, 125 B.R. 981 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1991).
SALE OF ESTATE PROPERTY. The debtor owned a
one-half interest in a stallion and sought court permission to
sell the horse free of the other co-owners’ interests with the
owners receiving their share of the proceeds. The other
owners objected, arguing that the sale of the horse would
decrease the value of their interests. The court held that the
sale could be allowed if (1) the partition of the property “in
kind” was not feasible and (2) the benefit to the estate was
greater than the detriment to the other owners. The court
calculated the benefit/detriment as follows: (1) the debtor’s
benefit equalled the proposed sale price of the entire interest
in the horse less the estimated price of selling only the one-
half interest in the horse; the other owners’ detriment
equalled their loss of income from the sale of their interests
less their after tax share of the proceeds of the sale of the
entire interest in the horse. The court established a
minimum price for the horse which produced 10 cents more
benefit to the debtor than detriment to the other owners and
held that under Section 363(h) that was enough to authorize
the sale at that minimum price or higher. In re Calumet
Farm, Inc., 150 B.R. 664 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1992).
    CHAPTER 12   
TRUSTEE FEES-ALM § 13.03[8]. The debtors’
Chapter 12 plan provided for payment of the trustee’s fees
except where direct payments to creditors were made.  The
plan also provided that the debtor would make all
disbursements under the plan except for payments required
to be made by the trustee. The trustee argued that the trustee
fee was required to be paid on all payments under the plan
on impaired claims, even those directly paid by the debtors.
The debtors argued that the plan allowed direct payment of
impaired claims; therefore, no fee was due for these direct
payments. The court held that under Section 586, payments
on impaired claims are made under the plan and require
payment of the trustee’s fee. In re Wagner, 150 B.R. 753
(Bankr. D. N.D. 1993).
During the administration of the debtor’s Chapter 12
plan, the Attorney General set the trustee’s fee at 11.111111
percent of all plan payments. The rate was based on the
interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 586(e)(1) to include payment
of the trustee’s fees as a plan payment also subject to the
trustee fee. Thus, the maximum rate of 10 percent was
charged against the debtor’s payments of the trustee’s fees.
The court held that the 11.111111 percent rate exceeded the
statutory maximum of 10 percent and ordered return of fees
assessed in excess of 10 percent. In re BDT Farms, Inc.,
150 B.R. 795 (Bankr. W.D. Okl. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtor incurred post-
petition federal tax liability and the IRS levied against the
debtor’s post-confirmation wages in excess of the wages
committed to the funding of the Chapter 13 plan. The debtor
sought sanctions against the IRS for violation of the
automatic stay. The court held that because all estate
property vested in the debtor upon confirmation, the levy
did not violate the automatic stay because the wages levied
against were not committed to payment for the Chapter 13
plan. In re Markowicz, 150 B.R. 461 (Bankr. D. Nev.
1993).
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The IRS filed a claim based
upon an unsecured tax lien and the Chapter 11 debtor
sought to avoid the unsecured tax lien under Section 506.
The bankruptcy court had ruled that the tax lien was
avoidable because Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S.Ct. 773 (1992)
was applicable only in Chapter 7 cases. The appellate court
reversed, holding that Dewsnup applied to all bankruptcy
cases and prohibited the avoidance of allowed unsecured
claims. In re Blue Pacific Car Wash, Inc., 150 B.R. 434
(W.D. Wis. 1992).
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS. Just prior to the debtor’s
filing for bankruptcy, the IRS filed tax liens against the
debtor and levied against the debtor’s interest in two IRA’s.
The money in one account was paid before the filing but the
money in the other account had not been paid. The debtor
sought avoidance of the first as a preferential transfer and
avoidance of the second lien as impairing an exemption.
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The court held that the action against the first levy was
barred by government immunity because the debtor sought
a return of money, but the action against the second levy
was not barred because no money had yet been paid. The
court also held that the second lien was not avoidable
because the lien would survive discharge of the underlying
taxes and could be enforced against exempt property after
the case was closed. In re Quillard, 150 B.R. 291 (Bankr.
D. R.I. 1993).
PASSIVE ACTIVITY LOSSES-ALM § 13.03[7]. The
court ruled that a debtor’s prepetition passive activity losses
do not pass to the bankruptcy estate but remain with the
debtor. In re Antonelli, 150 B.R. 364 (Bankr. D. Md.
1992). Note: the IRS has now issued proposed regulations
which include passive activity losses in the list of tax items
which pass to the bankruptcy estate in Chapters 7 and 11
(see Vol. 3, Agric. L. Dig., p. 191).
REFUND. The debtor and nondebtor spouse filed post-
petition separate income tax returns for a pre-petition tax
year. The returns involved property which was the debtor’s
sole property or community property. The IRS issued
separate refunds based on the returns and the bankruptcy
trustee sought turnover of the refund sent to the nondebtor
spouse. The court held that the refunds were estate property.
The court held that the filing of the return for the refund
was the responsibility of the trustee and the nondebtor
spouse’s filing for the return was a violation of the
automatic stay. The court rejected the nondebtor spouse’s
argument that the turnover could not include the portion of
the refund already spent. In re Burke, 150 B.R. 660
(Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993).
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. After the debtors received
a discharge of all income tax liability, the IRS made several
attempts to collect the discharged taxes. The debtors filed
for an injunction and attorney’s fees and costs incurred from
the violation of the discharge. Even after the IRS was found
to be in civil contempt for the post-discharge assessments,
the IRS continued to seek payment and to offset refunds
against the discharged taxes. Apparently, the IRS computer
personnel refused or were unable to remove the debtors
from the computer’s delinquent files. The Court held that
the IRS had waived its sovereign immunity by filing a claim
in the original case and that under I.R.C. § 7430, the debtors
were entitled to recover legal fees and costs incurred. In re
Abernathy, 150 B.R. 688 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993).
TAX LIEN. The debtor sought to have a federal tax lien
declared unsecured because the lien did not attach to the
debtor’s right to receive pension payments in the future and
the pension payments were exempt. The court held that the
tax lien attached to all of the debtor’s interests in property,
including the value of future payments from an existing
pension plan, whether or not the property was claimed as
exempt. The court also held that the lien was secured
because the lien secured taxes less than the claimed value of
the pension plan. In re Cook, 150 B.R. 439 (Bankr. E.D.
Ark. 1993).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
DAIRY TERMINATION PROGRAM. The plaintiff
was a dairy farmer who enrolled in the Dairy Termination
Program (DTP).  The ASCS ruled that the plaintiff had
violated the DTP contract in that two cows were not
destroyed and were still being milked by a former employee
of the plaintiff on another farm.  Although the plaintiff
pursued the ruling through DASCO and presented
substantial evidence to refute the statements of the former
employee as to how the cows escaped slaughter, the
plaintiff was not allowed to cross-examine the former
employee.  The court first held that the DASCO decision
was not reviewable de novo because the instant case was a
review of an administrative decision and not a contract case.
The court also held that the administrative appellate
procedure was governed by the ASCS appeal regulations, 7
C.F.R. Part 780, and not the Administrative Procedures Act.
However, the court held that the ASCS abused its discretion
under Part 780 in not allowing cross-examination of the
former employee, given the substantial contradictory
evidence and the ASCS strong reliance on the former
employee's statements in finding that the plaintiff had
violated the DTP contract. In addition, in its remand order,
the court required DASCO to make specific findings as to
the knowledge of the plaintiff as to the removal of the cows
by the former employer, because if the plaintiff did not
know about the removal, the plaintiff could not be held in
violation of the contract. DASCO failed to conduct a
remand hearing within the allotted time and the plaintiff
sought judgment on all issues in the plaintiff’s favor. The
court held that the plaintiff was entitled to judgment
removing all penalties resulting from the adverse DASCO
rulings. Because the plaintiff’s right to contract payments
required either an ASCS affirmative ruling of compliance
with all contract provisions or a waiver of violations based
on good faith compliance, the case was remanded to
DASCO for such determinations; however, the court
prohibited use of the former employee’s testimony as
support for any DASCO ruling.  Doty v. U.S., 27 Fed. Cl.
(1993). See also Doty v. U.S., 24 Cls.Ct. 615 (1991).
NATIONAL FORESTS. The plaintiffs were injured
while cutting trees under the employment of a company
which contracted with the Forest Service to cull trees from
national forests. The plaintiffs alleged that the Forest
Service  was negligent (1) in selecting contractors to cut the
trees, (2) in selecting the trees to be cut and the method for
cutting the trees, and (3) in failing to properly supervise the
culling. The court held that because no specific regulations
governed these Forest Service activities, the actions were
discretionary and exempt from claims under the Federal
Tort Claims Act. Layton v. U.S, 984 F.2d 1496 (8th Cir.
1993), aff’g, 776 F.Supp. 1373 (W.D. Ark. 1991).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT-ALM § 10.05[2]. The plaintiff was an officer and
shareholder of a corporation subject to PACA and which
from August 1987 through September 1987 purchased
produce without making prompt payment.  The plaintiff
resigned by a letter dated October 1, 1987, but did not
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abandon the plaintiff’s stock in the corporation. The
plaintiff owned 10.5 percent of the stock and served as a
director and vice-president and as manager for institutional
sales during the period of the nonpayments. The failures to
make prompt payment were found to be willful, flagrant
and repeated violations of PACA. The USDA had
determined that the plaintiff was “responsibly connected”
with the corporation which would result in the plaintiff
being barred from employment by a PACA licensee. The
plaintiff argued that although the plaintiff’s status in the
corporation as officer, director and more than 10 percent
shareholder fit the criteria of the statute, 7 U.S.C. §
499a(b)(9), the plaintiff, under Quinn v. Butz, 510 F.2d 743
(D.C. Cir. 1975), should have the opportunity to prove that
the plaintiff’s actual connection to the corporation was only
nominal. The court rejected the holding in Quinn and held
that the statute established a per se rule and because the
plaintiff had admitted being a director and officer of the
corporation during several of the violations, the plaintiff
was properly held to be responsibly connected with the
corporation. Faour v. U.S.D.A., 985 F.2d 217 (5th Cir.
1993).
PESTICIDES-ALM § 2.04. The plaintiff sued the
manufacturers of a pesticide, methyl bromide, for personal
injuries, alleging negligence, breach of warranty, and strict
liability. The plaintiff alleged inadequacies of the use
instructions, testing, research, labeling and warnings. The
court held that under Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 122
S.Ct. 2608 (1992) (federal cigarette labeling statute
preempted state action involving labeling), FIFRA
preempted the action insofar as the action related to labeling
or warnings but allowed state court actions for breach of
warranty. Brennan v. Dow Chemical Co., 613 So.2d 131
(Fla. Ct. App. 1993).
The plaintiff filed a personal injury action in negligence,
strict liability and breach of implied warranty for inadequate
labeling against the manufacturer of pesticides used on
dogs.  The manufacturer moved for partial summary
judgment on the inadequate labeling claims, arguing that the
FIFRA preempted the state negligence action.  The court
agreed and held that the inadequate labeling action was
barred by preemption of FIFRA.  Papas v. Upjohn Co.,
985 F.2d 516 (11th Cir. 1993), on rem. from, 112 S.Ct.
3020 (1992), vac’g and rem’g, 926 F.2d 1019 (11th Cir.
1991).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[4]. Under
the decedent’s will, executed in 1976, two trusts were
formed. The first trust provided for net income to be
distributed for life to the decedent’s servant with the
remainder to pass to a charitable organization. The second
trust provided for the servant’s lifetime use of an apartment
over a garage with the remainder of the property passing to
a charitable organization. The trusts were amended to
provide the servant with a fixed annuity payable from
income and corpus, with the remainder to the charitable
organization. The IRS ruled that the amended trusts
qualified for the charitable deduction because the difference
between the actuarial value of the qualified interest and the
actuarial value of the reformable interest did not exceed 5
percent of the actuarial value of the reformable interest. Ltr.
Rul. 9312020, Dec. 24, 1992.
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX-
ALM § 5.05[1].  The decedent owned six apartment
buildings and provided various services to the tenants either
by the decedent or by employees. The IRS ruled that the
services provided by the employees would be attributable to
the decedent and the decedent’s operation of the apartments
was a trade or business such that the decedent’s interest in
the buildings qualified as a closely held business for
purposes of paying estate tax by installments. Ltr. Rul.
9311031, Dec. 18, 1992.
VALUATION-ALM § 5.03. In April 1990, the taxpayer
established a five year irrevocable grantor retained interest
trust funded with nine pieces of artwork. The trust provided
for all income to be distributed to the taxpayer at least
annually with the remainder to pass to the taxpayer’s issue
per stirpes upon termination of the trust if the taxpayer was
still alive. The trust also terminated upon the death of the
taxpayer and the remainder then passed to the taxpayer's
estate if the taxpayer died before April 1993; otherwise, the
corpus passed to the taxpayer’s issue. The trustee had the
power to transfer or encumber the trust property and could
leave nonproductive property in the trust.  The taxpayer was
allowed to display the artwork without charge. The IRS
ruled that the value of the gift to the remainder holders was
determined under I.R.C. § 7520 because the trust was
established prior to the effective date of I.R.C. § 2702. The
value of the taxpayer’s retained interest was determined
using 120 percent of the applicable federal rate for April
1990 for a person of the age of the taxpayer, 71, as 45.366
percent of the value of the property transferred to the trust.
The gift was 54.364 percent of the value of the property
transferred to the trust. Ltr. Rul. 9313006, Jan. 6, 1993.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
COOPERATIVES-ALM § 14.03. A nonprofit,
nonstock cooperative purchased and distributed products for
franchised restaurants. The cooperative formed another
nonprofit, nonstock corporation to assume the entire
purchasing function for the franchises. The members of the
new corporation included the cooperative and all franchise
members. The IRS ruled that the new corporation operated
on a cooperative basis because (1) it had democratic control
in that all members had one vote and a majority of votes
was needed to elect directors; (2) the corporation had
subordination of capital in that all excess receipts above
expenses were to be returned to the member patrons based
on patronage; and (3) the allocation of excess revenues was
made in proportion to the patrons’ participation in the
corporation. Ltr. Rul. 9313016, Dec. 23, 1992.
C CORPORATIONS
ACCUMULATED EARNINGS TAX. The IRS had
assessed accumulated earnings tax (AET) against the
corporate taxpayer based upon the undistributed earnings of
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the corporation and the net liquid assets which resulted from
the sale of stock. The court found that the accumulation of
liquid assets was not for tax avoidance but was a reasonable
attempt to insulate the company from cash flow problems.
The court held that because the net liquid assets were not
accumulated for tax avoidance purposes, only the
accumulated earnings could be considered in assessing
AET. Network Systems Corp. v. U.S., 93-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,172 (D. Minn. 1993).
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT-ALM § 4.04 . The
taxpayer was not allowed investment tax credit for the
buildings that housed a car wash because the buildings were
not an inherent part of the car washing machinery since the
machinery could be replaced without replacing the
buildings. Schrum v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-124.
IRA. The taxpayer was the spouse and sole beneficiary
of the decedent’s IRA. At the date of the decedent’s death,
both the decedent and taxpayer were over 70 1/2 years of
age.  In the year of the decedent’s death, the taxpayer rolled
the decedent’s IRA funds over to a new IRA owned by the
taxpayer with distributions to begin in the following taxable
year. The IRS ruled that the rollover was effective even
though the taxpayer had already passed the required
beginning date for minimum distributions. The IRS also
ruled that no excise tax would be imposed for the year of
the decedent’s death for failure of the taxpayer to receive
any distribution from the taxpayer’s IRA because the
taxpayer’s IRA did not exist in the previous year. Ltr.Rul.
9311037, Dec. 22, 1992.
NET OPERATING LOSSES. The taxpayer was not
allowed to revoke valid elections to carry forward net
operating losses where although the return cited the
incorrect code section, the other information submitted with
the return demonstrated the intent to make the carryforward
election. Powers v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1993-125.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.
ADMINISTRATIVE ADJUSTMENTS. The court held
that the IRS was not barred by the statute of limitations
from filing a final partnership administrative adjustment
where the partnership had not filed returns for the taxable
years involved. Metals Refining Ltd. v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1993-115.
TAX SHELTERS. Limited partners were denied
deductions for their share of partnership research and
development fees, license fees and interest expenses
because the partnership’s putative business of exploiting a
synthetic fuel process lacked economic substance. The court
found that the partnership promoters’ connections with the
taxable entities involved with the partnership made the
partnership’s activites a sham with the only  purpose of the
partnership being to reap tax benefits. Peat Oil & Gas
Assoc. v. Comm’r, 100 T.C. No. 17 (1993).
PENSION PLANS. The IRS has issued guidance for
direct rollover, 60-day rollover and 20 percent income tax
withholding provisions for qualified pension plans under the
Unemployment Compensation Amendments of 1992.
Notice 93-3, I.R.B. 1993-3.
RETURNS. The IRS has announced corrections and
changes on the worksheet on page 36 of Publication 535 for
use in determining the deduction for medical insurance
premiums for self-employed persons where (1) the taxpayer
has more than one source of self-employment income, (2)
the foreign earned income exclusion is claimed on Forms
2555 or 2555-EZ, or (3) the tapxayer’s taxable year ends on
a date other than December 31, 1992. Ann. 93-53, I.R.B.
1993-14, 9.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].
PASSIVE INVESTMENT INCOME. An S corporation
had C corporation earnings and profits and had what was, at
the time, considered passive investment income (interest)
from lending customers money to purchase securities on
margin. The corporation decided to distribute all of the C
corporation earnings and profits but because it could not
afford to do so, required the shareholders to recontribute the
distributions except to the extent of the federal income tax
on the distributions. Subsequently, regulations were issued
which provided that the interest was not passive investment
income. The IRS ruled that the distributions would not have
qualified as effective to maintain the S corporation election;
however, because the regulations were effective for the
corporation’s taxable year of the interest income, the
corporation’s election did not terminate because of
excessive passive investment income. Ltr. Rul. 9312027,
Dec. 29, 1992.
TERMINATION. An S corporation issued stock to an
IRA of a shareholder without knowing that the transfer
resulted in the termination of the S corporation election.
The corporation repurchased the stock after learning from
tax counsel that the transfer terminated the election.  The
IRS waived the termination as inadvertent, with the
shareholder considered as owning the shares transferred to
the shareholder’s IRA. Ltr. Rul. 9312018, Dec. 23, 1992.
An S corporation issued stock to two partnerships which
were ineligible S corporation shareholders. The S
corporation stated that it had not intended to transfer the
stock to the partnerships but had intended to transfer the
shares directly to the individual partners. After some delay,
the shares were transferred to the partners. The IRS waived
the termination of S corporation status as inadvertent and
required the partnerships to be treated as the shareholders
for the period in which the partnerships owned the stock.
Ltr. Rul. 9312021, Dec. 24, 1992.
TRUSTS. A shareholder of an S corporation transferred
shares to an irrevocable trust for five beneficiaries, each
with an equal share in the trust. The trust did not file an
election to be treated as a QSST because of advice from
legal counsel that the election was not needed. The trust
provided for separate equal shares with each share receiving
one-fifth of the net trust income at least annually. Each
beneficiary was to receive the share of trust corpus at age
30. The IRS waived the termination of the S corporation
election as inadvertent and ruled that the trust qualified as a
QSST, treating each share as a separate trust. Ltr. Rul.
9313011, Dec. 18, 1992.
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WITHHOLDING TAXES-ALM § 4.06. The plaintiff
was a trucking company which provided its employee truck
drivers with the opportunity to obtain advance payments of
their compensation for “personal expense” while on the
road. The taxpayer also included reimbursements for travel
expenses to drivers for past expenses but did not separately
identify the travel expenses when the amounts were paid.
The court held that under Treas. Reg. § 31.3121(a)-1(h), the
advance payments were not wages subject to FICA
withholding because the advance payments were made
separately and were made for reasonable travel expenses.
The other payments were wages because not made
separately nor identified as reimbursed travel expenses.
Boyd Bros. Transp. Co., Inc. v. U.S., 27 Fed. Cl. 509
(1993).
LANDOWNER’S LIABILITY
RECREATIONAL USE-ALM § 1.02[1]. The plaintiff
was injured while riding on a three-wheeled cycle on the
defendant’s farm. The defendant’s dog had been chasing the
cycle and the driver ran into a fence when trying to avoid
hitting the dog. The plaintiff argued that the “dog bite
statute” applied to make the defendant liable for the acts of
the dog. The court held that the playful actions of a dog did
not make the owner liable under the statute which applied
only to vicious attacks by dogs. The plaintiff also argued
that the defendant was not protected by the recreational use
statute because the defendant did not allow the general
public to use the farm for recreational purposes. The court
held that the recreational use statute did relieve the
defendant of liability because the statute required only that
the defendant allow some members of the public to use the
land. Holden v. Schwer, 495 N.W.2d 269 (Neb. 1993).
PRODUCT LIABILITY
TRACTOR-ALM § 1.02[4]. The plaintiff’s decedent
was killed when the farm tractor the decedent was operating
rolled over as the decedent drove the tractor down a steep
hill. Although the tractor was available with a roll over
protective system (ROPS), the purchaser, the decedent’s
employer, did not purchase the tractor with the ROPS. The
plaintiff sued the manufacturer for breach of implied
warranting of merchantability for failing to have a ROPS,
for negligence and breach of implied warranty of
merchantability for failure to warn about operating the
tractor on steep hills, and negligent design. The court
upheld summary judgment for the defendant. The court held
that no breach of implied warranty of merchantability
occurred because of the failure of the tractor to have a
ROPS because the ROPS was available but the tractor was
not purchased with the ROPS. Although the court rejected
the defendant’s argument that it had no duty to warn about
open and obvious dangers, the court held that the failure to
warn was not an approximate cause of the decedent’s death
where the decedent had been warned about the danger of
driving on steep hills and the lack of a ROPS was obvious.
The court also held that the tractor was not negligently
designed because the tractor was available with a ROPS and
the purchaser voluntarily purchased the tractor without the
ROPS. The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the
manufacturer had a duty to “retrofit” the tractor to increase
the roll over protection. Butler v. Navistar Intern. Transp.
Corp., 809 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. Va. 1991).
RIPARIAN RIGHTS
NUISANCE. The plaintiff owned land across from and
downstream for the defendant. The defendant conducted
earthwork projects which the plaintiff claimed caused the
river to flood onto the plaintif’s land. The nearby city had
sought to have the work declared in violation of a city
ordinance and a public nuisance. The plaintiff argued that
because the earthwork violated the city ordinance, the work
was a private nusiance by law subject to abatement. The
court held that the plaintiff must also show that the violation
of the ordinance caused harm to the plaintiff. The court
reversed the jury verdict for the defendant because the jury
instructions implied that the defendant had the right to take
whatever action was necessary to protect the property from
flooding, whereas the law allowed the defendant only to
restore the river bank to its original condition or to return
the river to its original course. Smicklas v. Spitz, 846 P.2d
362 (Okla. 1992).
STATE TAXATION
VALUATION. The plaintiffs contested the valuation of
their ranch land for property tax purposes. The plaintiffs
argued that the valuation was arbitrary and capricious
because the valuation did not account for the failure of the
plaintiffs to make any profit from the land. The Appraisal
District had used cash leases of comparable property near
the plaintiff’s land to determine the value of the plaintiff’s
land. The court held that the valuation statute and
regulations did not allow consideration of the individual
owner’s inability to make a profit from the land and upheld
the valuation. Walker v. Appraisal Review Bd., 846
S.W.2d 14 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
FEDERAL FARM PRODUCTS RULE-ALM §
13.01[4][a]. The plaintiff bank had a perfected security
interest in cattle purchased by the debtor for feeding and
resale. The debtor sold the cattle to the defendant but failed
to make payment of the loan secured by the cattle. The bank
sought return of the cattle from the defendant based upon its
priority security interest. The bank claimed that the federal
farm products rule did not apply because the defendant did
not purchase the cattle in good faith and because the cattle
were not farm products since the cattle were not raised by
the debtor. The court held that the federal farm products
rule had no good faith purchase requirement and that cattle
fed by the debtor engaged in a cattle feedlot operation were
farm products. Because the state did not have a certified
central filing system and the bank failed to give the required
notice of its security agreement, the defendant took title to
the cattle free of the security interest. Asburn Bank v.
Farr, 426 S.E.2d 63 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992).
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SUBORDINATION. One of the debtor’s creditors had
obtained a perfected security interest on the debtor’s farm
equipment. The debtor sought an FmHA loan but the
FmHA required that the debtor obtain subordination of the
creditor’s security interest so that the FmHA security
interest on the equipment would have priority. The FmHA
entered into a subordination agreement with the creditor but
the agreement did not specifically require subordination of
the creditor’s security interest on the equipment, although
the agreement referred subordination of the creditor’s
“mortgages.” At the closing, the FmHA sent a transmittal
letter requesting the creditor to release its lien on the
equipment but the creditor did not do so. The court held
that the subordination agreement did not subordinate the
creditor’s security interest in the farm equipment because
the agreement did not specifically mention the security
interest nor did any of the extrinsic evidence indicate that
the parties intended the agreement to cover the security
interest in the equipment. U.S. v. Haas Fruit, 812 F. Supp.
173 (E.D. Wash. 1993).
The Agricultural Law Press announces
its newest publication with a special offer:
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to commemorate the assumption of
the publication of the Manual by the Agricultural Law
Press, the Manual is offered to new subscribers at $115,
including at no extra charge updates published within
five months after purchase. Updates are published every
four months to keep the Manual current with the latest
developments. After the first free update, additional updates
will be billed at $35 each in 1993.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$6.35 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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